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SYMPOSIUM
PANEL I: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE FEDERALIST: THE NATURE OF LAW
AND THE NATURE OF MAN
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: THE FRAMERS
CONSTRUCT AN ORRERY
HAROLD H. BRUFF*
In a museum in Philadelphia, you can still see an object that
the Framers regarded with wonder and awe.1 It is called an or-
rery-a mechanical model of the solar system that made the
principles of Newtonian physics concrete.2 An orrery aptly
symbolizes the development of The Federalist Papers in three re-
spects. First, it symbolizes the symmetry of The Federalist Papers
themselves, crafted as they were to provide a coherent theory
for what actually was the product of a rather rowdy democratic
process of collective choice. Second, it symbolizes the delicate
balances of the government the Framers constructed. Third,
and most importantly, it symbolizes the legal adjustment of
centripetal and centrifugal forces that the Framers perceived
within the nature of man.
Just as they understood the orrery, the Framers saw human
nature as both ultimately balanced and quite complex. As for
balance, Madison famously remarked that people are not an-
gels and, therefore, need government.3 Likewise, Hamilton
* Rothschild Research Professor of Law, George Washington University National
Law Center. B.A. 1965, Williams; J.D. 1968, Harvard University.
1. Thomas Jefferson wrote to David Rittenhouse, the inventor of the orrery, saying
"The amazing mechanical representation of the solar system which you conceived and
executed, has never been surpassed by any but the work of which it is a copy." GARRY
WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 100 (1978)(quoting 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
203 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950)).
2. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA, supra note 1, at 100; see also GARRY WILLS, !.XPLAINING
AMERICA 7 (1981)(referring to the orrery as a "philosuphical apparatus").
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison stated:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
often quoted an aphorism of Hume that in constructing gov-
ernment we must suppose each person a "knave." 4 And yet, at
the same time, the concept of public virtue was very real to the
Framers. They could, without any sign of embarrassment,
sculpt their heroes in togas. They thought that the process of
government could elevate the best characters to serve as our
governors: after all, both the Continental Congress and the
Constitutional Convention had done so. The Framers also had
waiting for ratification the man who would be twice unanimous
in the electoral college, so there was reason for optimism about
the character of future leaders as well.
In The Federalist Number 76, Hamilton captured the essence of
the Framers' view of human nature by saying that suppositions
of "universal venality" in people are as wrong as suppositions
of "universal rectitude."' The Framers saw the Constitution as
a means of social mechanics. They believed that the institutions
they were creating could elicit the best from people as long as
there were "auxiliary precautions" to "supply the defect of bet-
ter motives. ' In other words, hope for the best, but provide
safeguards to make life "easier for the preacher."
The Federalist Papers stress two basic devices designed to har-
ness human behavior-the nature of representation and the
structure of the federal government. In The Federalist Number 10,
Madison argued that the nature of representation could control
the hazardous effects of faction and personal interests.7
The essential thesis of The Federalist Number 10 stands the phi-
losophy of Montesquieu on its head by arguing that the large
4. DAVID HUME, 1 ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 117-19 (T.H. Green &
T.H. Grose eds., London, Longmans, Green 1882), quoted in WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 190 ("It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must
be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim
should be true in politics which is false in fact.").
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton stated, "The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an
error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution
of delegated power implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind,
which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence."
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 3, at 322. Madison stated:
A dependence on people is, no doubt, the primary control on the govern-
ment; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau-
tions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better
motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private
as well as public.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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size of our country would aid the formation of a sound repub-
lic, rather than hamper it.8 Madison believed that the greater
variety of interests would prove self-canceling and that even
where a majority was reached, the larger numbers required to
compose it would be less capable of orchestrating oppressive
plans.9
Madison stressed that the mechanics of representation would
help government transcend special interests. He thought that a
representative government would avoid the conflict-of-interest
problem that direct democracies face, namely that every person
ultimately seeks to be the judge in his own cause.10 Publius saw
that factious majorities were frequently at the heart of problems
under the revolutionary state governments. 1' Those uncon-
trolled legislatures had produced the kinds of "wicked" (level-
ing) legislation that Madison refers to in The Federalist Number
10: paper money, abolition of debt, and the equal division of
property. 2 He believed that representatives drawn from large
8. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWvS, Book VIII Chapter 16 (Thomas Nugent
trans., David W. Carrithers ed., University of California Press 1977)(1750). Montes-
quieu premised the stability of a republic on its size:
In a large republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is
subordinate to exceptions; and depends on accidents. In a small one, the in-
terest of the public is easier percieved, better understood, and more within the
reach of every citizen; abuses have a lesser extent, and of course are less
protected.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 82-83. Madison stated:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass
within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.
l at 83.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 82. Madison argued that representation
would "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their coun-
try and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least likely to sacrifice it to tempo-
rary or partial considerations." See also WILLS, ExPLAINING AMERICA, supra note 2, at
258 ("Majority factions pose the great problem.").
11. GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87, 502
(1969)("Indeed, it was this factious majoritarianism, an anomalous and frightening
conception for republican government, grounded as it was on majority rule, that was at
the center of the Federalist perception of politics.").
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 84. Madison stated:
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other
10 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 16
districts could stand as disinterested arbiters among competing
claims, thus preventing oppressive legislation."3
Publius argued that the other main technique for harnessing
behavior lay in the structure of government. Because everyone
assumed that separation of powers was beneficial, Madison
could simply invoke the oracle Montesquieu. 14 He then, how-
ever, moved quickly to more controversial ground-the system
of checks and balances. By blending some fundamental powers,
checks and balances controverted the prevailing view of gov-
ernmental structure. In The Federalist Numbers 47 through 51,
Madison faced the need to find a new basis for checks and bal-
ances. He found that basis in the perceptions of human nature
that he shared with the other Framers. Older theories, such as
mixture-government theories, had found checks in competing
social classes-the aristocracy versus the monarchy, for exam-
ple.' 5 The revolutionary state governments, lacking such social
strata, included strong constitutional requirements for sepa-
rated powers, yet the legislatures actually dominated the public
sphere. Madison correctly thought that this experience proved
that the Framers could not rely on mere "parchment barriers"
States.... A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less
apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it, in
the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular
county or district than an entire State.
13. At the Constitutional Convention, when Madison rehearsed these two argu-
ments, Hamilton's reaction was, "There is truth in both these principles but they do
not conclude so strongly as he supposes." WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA, supra note 2, at
263 (quoting 4 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 165.66
(Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1961)). However, by the time they wrote together as Pub-
lius, Hamilton agreed with Madison. See THE FEDERALIST No. 60 (Alexander Hamil-
ton)(asserting the difficulty of forming factions in such a large republic); THe
FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (extolling the virtues of elections).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison stated:
[L]iberty requires that the three great departments of power should be sepa-
rate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the cele-
brated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the
science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it
most effectually to the attention of mankind.
15. For example, Publius notes the ownership of property as a source of division.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 79 ("But the most common and durable source
of factions has been the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of property. Those who
hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in soci-
ety."). For a general discussion of mixture-goverment theories, see generally WooD,
supra note 11, at 151.
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to maintain the separation of the branches.16
The Federalist Papers set forth three basic ways that a combina-
tion of separation of powers and checks and balances would
promote the public interest. First, multiple representation
would force repeated consideration of proposals by the House
of Representatives, the Senate, and the President. This would
weed out passion, weaken the House, and assure mature con-
sideration of public issues." 7 Second, Publius argued that the
separation of powers would strengthen those parts of govern-
ment associated with reason-the judiciary, the executive, and
the senate-and would correspondingly weaken those parts as-
sociated with passion-the House of Representatives and the
state assemblies."8 Finally, to these advantages the Framers ad-
ded checks and balances to ensure that no one part could gain
too much power and, consequently, become too self-interested.
Publius believed that the private interests of competing office
holders would ultimately be a "sentinel over the public
rights."' 9 By setting selfish private motives against each other,
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-09 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison argued:
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these depart-
ments in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment
barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which
appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the
American constitutions. But experience assures us that the efficacy of the pro-
vision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is
indispensably necessary for the more feeble against the more powerful mem-
bers of the government.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton believed that multiple representation would constrain governmental
actors:
It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard
the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of
that body.... The primary inducement to conferring the power in question
upon the Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to
increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 16, at 309. Madison stated:
[W]here the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by
a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own
strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a
multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of
its passions by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions.
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 316-317 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 8, at 322.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
the Constitution would convert the personal ambitions of gov-
ernment officers into protections for the rights of the public.2 °
An example of this phenomenon is the career politician who
must appeal to his constituency in order to move up the ranks
of government service.
How could Publius have thought that a fractured govern-
ment in a fractured society would produce the kinds of civic
virtue and service of the public interest that he desired? Per-
haps the answer lies in a final consideration of the orrery.
When you first see it, everything is spinning, some parts slow,
some fast, seemingly out of control. But when you look more
closely, you see that every part is securely in its orbit.2 '
20. Id.
21. Hamilton himself marveled at the "ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within
which such [governmental] systems are to revolve ...... THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 73
(Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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